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ABSTRACT
Two hypotheses (Holyoak and Glass, 1975) concerning how
particular types of false statements are recognized as false were
investigated. Experiment 1 examined two factors affecting the
time subjects need to reject false, universal affirmative propo-
sitions in which the subject- and predicate-concept represent
instances from the same semantic category (e.g., "All skunks are
beavers 11 ). The more accessible in memory was the fact that the
subject and predicate had the same immediate superordinate , the
faster subjects were to reject the statement in a sentence-
verification task. Also, the more similar the two instances were,
the slower the subjects were to decide that the proposition was
false.
Experiment 2 examined two factors affecting reaction time
to reject false, universal affirmative propositions in which the
predicate is an instance in the category designated by the subject-
term (e.g., "All animals are panthers" ). The more accessible a
counterexample to the proposition was (e.g., "Some animals are
dogsw )i the faster subjects were to reject the statement. Also,
the more typical the predicate was rated as an instance of the
subject-category, the slower subjects were to reject the statement.
These findings were interpreted as posing difficulties for the
models of semantic memory proposed by Smith, Shoben, and Rips
(1974) and Holyoak and Glass (1975) i while being consistent with
some proposals of Collins and Quillian (1969). The implications
of the results were considered with respect to some important
issues concerning semantic memory structure and process.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Collins and Quillian's (I969) seminal paper,
semantic memory has been a prominent topic of research in
cognitive psychology. Much of the research which attempts to
elucidate semantic memory organization and process has concerned
itself with the question of how subjects verify true statements.
However, investigators have recently begun to look more closely
at how false statements are processed. There are two reasons
for this development. First, an adequate theory of semantic
memory must provide an account of how false assertions are recog-
nized as such. Second, detailed examination of how false state-
ments are processed may provide information about basic memory
structure and process which verification studies fail to supply.
In a typical semantic memory task, the subject's task is
to judge the truth value of a simple statement as quickly as
possible. For example, the sentence "All canaries are birds"
might be presented and the subject's latency to respond "true"
would be the dependent variable of interest. In most studies, a
positive response to a stimulus sentence probably depends upon
the recognition that the asserted relationship between the subject
and predicate — "canaries" and "birds" — is the actual relation-
ship between them. (An exception to this statement is the work
of Collins and Quillian (1969; 19?0b; 19?2b).) The rejection of
a false statement, on the other hand, probably entails the use
of
information not presented in the stimulus.
It may sometimes be the case that directly-stored negative
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information is used to reject a false proposition. For example,
the assertion that "A dog is a cat" may be rejected by finding
the information in memory that "A dog is not a cat". However,
direct storage of negative information is probably an infrequent
occurrence. More often, rejections probably result from logical
inferences based on less direct information concerning the assertion
being evaluated. For instance, a subject knows that both "dog" and
"cat" occupy the same level in the same semantic hierarchy — both
are common instances of the category "animals". That information
is one potential basis for the inference that a dog is not a cat.
If the statement "All animals are dogs" is presented, it may be
rejected in at least two ways. The subject may recognize that the
statement reverses the actual relationship between "animals" and
"dogs"; or a counterexample to the statement might be retrieved
from memory, e.g., "Some animals are cats". Another rejection
strategy might depend on inductive reasoning. For example, a
subject who does not have stored the fact that "A whale is a
mammal" may reason that a whale is like a fish and fish are not
mammaIs, therefore a whale is not a mammal. (Such a strategy is
probably time-consuming and error-prone.) Still another potential
basis for inferring that a proposition is false is the failure to
find the proposition, or any relevant information with which to
evaluate the proposition, in memory. If the proposed instance,
e.g., "whale", is not found after an exhaustive search of the
designated category, "mammal", then a negative decision results.
This strategy is the implicit basis for all negative decisions in
some category-search models of long-term memory (e.g., Landauer
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and Meyer, 1972). As such, it represents a rather special
rejection strategy.
It is easy to understand the difficulties in trying to
explain how false statements are processed. However, not only
is the issue an interesting one in itself, it encompasses other
important issues concerning semantic memory t What is stored in
memory?; How is information organized?; Is the search process
involved in information retrieval directed or undirected (Anderson
and Bower, 1972)?; How is relevant information distinguished from
irrelevant information during the evaluation of a proposition?
The present study focuses on two possible bases subjects use for
rejecting false statements in an effort to gather some information
regarding the questions which have been raised.
4.
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The theoretical context within which the present research
evolves includes a number of important issues specific to the
question of how false statements are processed and to the more
general topic of semantic memory structure and process. However,
two issues are of central importance. These issues are t (l) are
"false" responses based upon something other than a failure to
find a "match" in memory with the stimulus proposition?; and
(2) if "false" responses are based on the positive retrieval of
some sort of information, what sort of information is it and how
is it accessed? The literature review follows the organization
provided by these two issues. Four theories of semantic memory
which respond to these questions in different ways are considered.
First, the exhaustive search hypothesis represents the
simplest response to the above questions. It states that false
propositions are rejected when no "match" for the stimulus
proposition can be found in memory.
Next, the feature comparison model remains within the set-
theoretic tradition of the exhaustive search model in maintaining
an emphasis on a simple match-mismatch process of evaluation of
stimulus propositions. Thus, like the exhaustive search hypothesis,
it answers the first question above in the negative. However,
the feature comparison model conceptualizes the processes leading
to the rejection of a false statement as quite different from those
hypothesized by the exhaustive search model. The source of the
differences lies in the unique system of information representation
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hypothesized by the feature comparison model.
The final two theories to be reviewed contend that "false"
responses are based upon something other than the failure to find
some simple "match" in memory. Rather, the theories of Holyoak
and Glass, and Collins and Quillian hypothesize that many false
propositions are rejected on the basis of the retrieval and
evaluation of indirect relationships between their subject- and
predicate-concepts. The theories differ in how they conceptualize
the retrieval process and in the types of information they claim
is considered during the evaluation of a proposition.
The following review is divided into four subsections
corresponding to the four theories noted above. The organization
of each subsection is basically the same: A theory is presented;
then the evidence supporting it is examined; finally, some of its
weaknesses are noted. Throughout the section, the concern is with
results from variations on the same basic paradigm. The sentence-
verification paradigm involves presentation of a logically quanti-
fied or unquantified proposition which the subject must evaluate
and respond "true" or "false" to as rapidly as possible. A
prominent variation of this task involves presentation of just
two nouns, always in the same relative positions (e.g., one above
the other) on each trial; the subjects task being to determine
whether, for example, the bottom noun is a member of the category
designated by the top noun. Reaction time is the dependent
variable in both the sentence-verification and the categorization
paradigm.
6.
The Exhaustive Search Hypothesis
Although there are a number of bases on which a proposition
night be rejected, not all theorists agree that the processing of
false statements is complex. In particular, a frequent hypothesis
of category-search models (e.g., Landauer and Meyer, 1972) is that
negative decisions result after an exhaustive search of the desig-
nated category fails to locate the target instance. That is, no
"match" can be found in memory for the stimulus proposition. A
direct prediction of this "exhaustive search hypothesis" is that
negative RT should increase monotonically with increases in the
size of the search set. For example, according to the exhaustive
search hypothesis, it should take longer to respond that a "table"
is not an "animal", than to respond that a "table" is not a "dog".
The issue of the effect on reaction time (RT) of- semantic
category size In a sentence-verification task was a prominent one
during the first few years after Collins and Quillian's (1969)
paper. In general, the results of this research support the
exhaustive search hypothesis. Small, but consistent category-
size effects or. negative RT have been reported by several investi-
gators (Landauer and Freedman, 1968; Meyer, 1969 ; 1970; 1973a;
1973^; Keyer and Ellis, 1970; Wilkins, 1970). However, interpre-
tations of these findings are made ambiguous by methodological
difficulties consistently encountered in this literature.
Typically, no tests of the generality of category-size effects to
the population from which stimulus materials were selected are
provided (Clark, 1973). Further, usually no controls are provided
for possible systematic differences in word-frequency as a function
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of category-size; or for possible differences in associative
relationships of the instances with respect to the large and
small categories. Both of these factors are known to affect RT
and are frequently found to covary with category-size (e.g.,
Collins and Quillian, 1970a; Wilkins, 1971; Loftus and Freedman,
1972; Anderson and Reder, 1974). (Landauer and Meyer, 1972,
have discussed the difficulties of the category-size research in
some detail.) Thus evidence that subjects reject false proposi-
tions on the basis of not being able to find confirming informa-
tion in memory is unconvincing.
There are stronger reasons for rejecting the exhaustive
search hypothesis as the sole basis for a negative decision.
There is direct evidence (Anderson and Reder, 197'+? Glass, Holyoak
and C'Dell, 197^; Holyoak and Glass, 1975) that subjects do use
other bases for rejecting false propositions. Further, there is
evidence that the category-size effect disappears or actually
reverses for particular category comparisons (e.g., when instances
are categorized with respect to the category "mammals" versus
"animals"), or when the semantic relatedness of the instance and
category and category-size are manipulated orthogonally (Collins
and Quillian, 1970a; Rips, Shoben, and Smith, 1973? Smith, Shoben,
and Rips, 197^). Thus, the exhaustive search hypothesis seems
insufficient as the sole explanation of how false propositions
are processed.
8.
Smith, Shoben, and Rips: A Feature Comparison Model
Smith, Shoben, and Rips (197^; Smith, Rips, and Shoben,
197*0 have proposed a model which was originally formulated to
explain performance in categorization tasks, but which has been
generalized to account for results from a wide range of semantic
memory experiments. Although within the set-theoretic approach,
the theory does not assume that an exhaustive search process is
the basis for all negative responses. However, it does emphasize
a match-mismatch process of information evaluation and the memory
structure it hypothesizes is designed to implement such a process
in a straightforward manner.
The most important aspect of the feature comparison
model is the representational system for semantic information it
hypothesizes. It is proposed that concepts are represented in
memory as a set of semantic dimensions. Each dimension is associ-
ated with a weight which indicates how essential that dimension is
to the meaning of the lexical item. These weights form the basis
for a distinction made between "defining" and "characteristic 11
features. When an item is retrieved from memory, it is not the
entire set of dimensions but "points" on the relevant dimensions
which are sampled. For each concept, there is a distribution of
possible values on any one dimension corresponding to one's
subjective impressions of the relative frequencies of the dimension
values for that items The momentary (random variable) values on
the relevant semantic dimensions of a concept are called "features".
These structural assumptions are the task- invariants of the model;
the basic processing assumptions follow.
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A two-stage process model is proposed to account for
categorization performance. When a proposition is presented, the
defining and characteristic features of both the subject and
predicate concepts are retrieved and compared during the first
stage of processing. 1 For example, if the proposition is "A
canary is a bird", the attributes of both bird (e.g., feathered,
flies, wings, beak, etc.) and canary (e.g., feathered, flies,
wings, yellow, etc.) are retrieved and compared. The holistic
comparison process yields a measure, x, of the overall similarity
of the two concepts. This measure may be thought of as represent-
ing the semantic "overlap" between the two concepts; or the
proportion of all predicate features shared by the subject concept.
If x is greater than some high criterion of dissimilarity, a fast
positive decision results; if x falls below a criterion of dissimi-
larity, a fast negative decision results; if x falls between the
two similarity criteria, the second stage of processing is entered.
In the second stage of processing, the defining features
of the subject (canary) and predicate (bird) of the proposition
are isolated and compared. Defining features are essential to the
meaning of a concept, while characteristic features are not. For
example, a defining feature of all birds is that they have wings;
however, it is only characteristic of birds that they can fly.
If (a) each defining dimension of the predicate is also a defining
dimension of the subject concept, a;nd (b) the values on the
iNote the difference between the exhaustive search model
and the feature comparison model i the former states that a long-
term memory representation is compared with the stimulus proposition
during the match-mismatch evaluation; while the latter states that
the comparison is between two long-term memory representations —
the subject- and predicate-concepts.
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dimensions (features) of the subject-concept are within the
allowable range for the predicate-concept, a positive response
results; otherwise, a negative response will be given. The
feature-comparison process is hypothesized to be exhaustive for
both true and false subject-predicate pairs. Finally, second-
stage processing is hypothesized to be error-free; all errors
are the result of first-stage processing.
The predictions of the feature comparison model with
respect to categorization performance are straightforward. If a
positive decision is called for, RT will be shorter the more
similar the subject and predicate concepts are because a high
proportion of responses will be made on the basis of first-stage
processing only. If a negative response is appropriate, greater
similarity between the subject and predicate will slow RT because
second-stage processing vrill be more frequent. If the degree of
similarity between the subject and predicate contradicts their
actual relationship, the probability of a fast (first stage),
incorrect response is increased. These predictions are well-
supported in the literature. We are concerned with the pattern
of negative RTs as a function of subject-predicate similarity.
A number of studies suggest that as subject-predicate
similarity increases, negative RT increases (Collins, 1969; 1970a;
1970b; 1972b; Conrad, 1972; Meyer, 1970; Rips, 1975; Sips, Smith,
and Shoben, 1973; Schaeffer and Wallace, 1969; 1970; Smith, et. al. ,
1974a; Wilkins, 1971)* However, these experiments are subject to
many of the criticisms made with respect to the category-size effect
literature. There frequently were no controls for the possibility
that word-frequency and subject-predicate similarity may covary
in the stimuli used. Further, no statistical measure of the
generalizability of results to items other than those specifically
used as stimuli is presented in any of the above experiments. On
the other hand, the effects reported are quite large (ranging up
to 250 milliseconds) relative to those generally reported for
category-size manipulations. Also, the effect of semantic
relatedness on positive RT is the best documented in the semantic
memory literature; thus, semantic relatedness would be expected
to have a prominent influence on the processing of false proposi-
tions as well. (The term "semantic relatedness" is used to refer
noncommitally to any of several, highly-confounded measures of
the strength of the semantic relationship between two concepts.
Examples of such measures are similarity and typicality ratings,
production frequency, and association norms.)
Smith, et. al. (l97^b) have conducted an experiment which
responds to most of these criticisms. It is a simple categoriza-
tion experiment in which stimulus presentation was blocked by
category (judgments were made with respect to the same category
throughout a block of trials). The relevant manipulation was
that negative instances were of three levels of rated-relatedness
to the target category. The results were in accord with the
model's predictions: slower RTs and higher error rates were
found with increasing category-negative instance similarity.
However, the size of the effect was small (thirty-six milliseconds)
and no measure of the statistical reliability of the effect was
reported. A probable reason for these unconvincing results is
that negative instances were always drawn from the same category
for a particular trial block (the category most closely related
to the target category). This procedure probably restricted the
range of similarity of the negative instances to the target
category and may have encouraged a strategy of rejecting negative
instances by recognizing that they belonged to the single category
from which all negative instances were selected in a particular
block of trials (Anderson and Reder, 1974; Glass, et. al.
, 1974;
Holyoak and Glass, 1975).
Glass, et. al. (1974) have presented clear evidence in
support of the feature comparison model. They controlled word-
frequency, collected objective measures of subject-predicate
relatedness for false as well as true propositions, and used
statistical procedures allowing generalization of the results to
the population of items from which the stimulus materials were
selected (Clark, 1973). Their sentence-verification experiment
(Experiment 2) manipulated the quantifier ("all", "some", "many",
"no"), truth value, and semantic relatedness of the proposition.
Highly-related subject-predicate pairs for true propositions
were replaced by quantifiers which made them false (e.g., for
"Some birds are canaries", "no" might replace "some" to produce a
high-relatedness, false proposition). Low-relatedness, false
propositions were constructed by rearranging the predicates of the
high-relatedness, false propositions to form anomalous statements.
For instance, "All chairs are lions" would be an anomalous propo-
sition. As expected, RTs were slower for high- than for low-
relatedness false propositions quantified by "some", "all", and
"many" (the effect ranged from 144 to 362 milliseconds); but were
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faster for high- than for low-relatedness false propositions
quantified by "no" (eighty-two milliseconds). 2 These findings
were replicated (Experiment 3) for property statements (adjectives
were used in the predicate position instead of nouns) and with the
addition of "few" (which behaved as predicted for a negative
quantifier) as a fifth quantifier.
To summarize, there appears to be clear evidence for the
similarity/negative RT effect predicted by the feature comparison
model (Smith, et, al» , 1974a; 1974b), If the comparison of
semantic features in a match-mismatch process is the sole basis
on which the truth value of a proposition is judged, then the
complicated picture of negative information processing drawn in
the introduction to this study is incorrect. However, there is
recent evidence that at least some of the bases for rejecting
false propositions which were suggested in the introduction may
in fact be used by subjects. Let us now turn to that evidence.
^The pattern is reversed for negative quantifiers pre-
sumably because subjects evaluate the affirmative, "base"
portion of a proposition, then apply the negative quantifier to
reverse the decision reached in the first step of evaluation.
Thus, for the proposition nNo dogs are animals", the subject first
determines that a dog is an animal. This retrieved fact matches
the root proposition, "jJogs are animals". To the "match" outcome
is then applied the negative quantifier with the result of a
negative decision. The important observation to be made is that,
according to this model (which is adopted by Smith, et. alt , 1974b),
a negative decision with respect to a negatively-quantified
proposition is based on a "match" outcome during the memory search
and comparison stages of information-processing. Since high
semantic-re latedness is hypothesized to facilitate a "match", RT
to negatively-quantified false propositions and positively-
quantified true proposition should — and does — decrease as
semantic-relatedness increases.
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Holyoak and Glass; Contradictions and Counterexamples
Kolyoak and Glass (1975) do not provide a well-formulated
alternative to the exhaustive search and feature comparison models.
However, they are explicit in their claim that not all false
responses are based on the failure to find a match between either
a memory representation and the stimulus proposition (exhaustive
search model), or between long-term memory feature-lists repre-
senting the subject- and predicate-concepts of a proposition
(feature comparison model). They contend that many false responses
are based on the positive retrieval of information about the
subject- and predicate concepts of a proposition which only
indirectly relates the two concepts (e.g., a "dog" and a "horse"
are indirectly-related in that they both are "animals").
Holyoak and Glass (1975) hypothesize that items retrieved
from memory in response to a particular stimulus word are found
in a limited capacity search whose order is determined by the
relatedness of the individual items to that word. An important
implicit assunption made is that the search is one-way, proceeding
from the subject-concept and unaffected by the particular predicate
of the complete proposition which is presented in the actual
sentence-verification task.
3
Holyoak and Glass* s explanation of how propositions are
actually rejected is more detailed. They are in agreement with
the position that false propositions are rejected for numerous
reasons. They have considered three "strategies" of information-
3lt is not clear that Holyoak and Glass wish to be held to
this conceptualization. However, it is a theoretical issue of some
interest and will tentatively be attributed to them as a point of
contrast with Collins and Quillian's model of the retrieval process.
1 5-
evaluation other than simple verification by recognition, (e.g.,
"A is, indeed, a B"), (Glass, et. al.
. 197^; Kolyoak and Glass,
1975); although nothing in their work indicates that they consider
these strategies the only bases for reaching a decision as to the
truth-value of a proposition. Of particular interest are two
hypothesized bases for a negative decision ~ the contradiction
and counterexample hypotheses (Glass, et. al.
, 1974; Holyoak and
Glass, 1975) • The contradiction hypothesis asserts that false
propositions in which the subject and predicate represent concepts
from the same level in the same semantic hierarchy (e.g., "dog 11
and "cat") are rejected on the basis of finding that the actual
relationship between the two concepts contradicts the asserted
relationship. Thus, RT to make a "false" response is determined
by how quickly the information is accessed that the subject and
predicate have the same, immediate superordinate. The counter-
example hypothesis refers to a second situation in which
contradictory information forms the basis for a negative decision.
In the case of universal propositions, if the subject of the
proposition is a superset of the predicate, or the predicate is
one of more than one possible value of an attribute of the subject-
concept; then the proposition may be rejected when a counterexample
to the assertion is retrieved. For example, the assertion that
"All animals are dogs" will probably be rejected on the basis of
finding in memory an instance of the category "animal" which is
not also the particular predicate, "dog" (e.g., "cat").
The contradiction and counterexample hypotheses make clear
an important point of contrast between Holyoak and Glass and Smith,
Shoben and Rips. Holyoak and Glass not only contend that many
false statements are rejected on the basis of the positive
retrieval of information about the subject- and predicate-concept
of the propositions, they further hypothesize that information
about the subset/superset relationships the subject and/or
predicate concept are involved in is a particularly important
basis for a decision about the truth-value of a proposition.
This is in contrast to the feature-comparison model, which
emphasizes the importance of property information concerning a
concept and denies that subset/superset information is utilized
during the evaluation of a proposition.
To summarize the Holyoak and Glass (1975) model, informa-
tion retrieved in an ordered
,
(self-terminating) search of the
subject-concept f s associates is compared with the asserted
relationship between the subject and predicate. Retrieved infor-
mation which contradicts the asserted proposition forms the
basis for a "false" response.
There are four important sources of support for Holyoak
and Glass's contentions. First, Anderson and Reder (197*0 have
conducted a multiple regression study of factors which might
affect RT in a categorization task. The dependent variable of
interest here is RT to reject a negative instance, or "instance
negation time" (INT). Of twenty-two independent variables
entered into a stepwise multiple regression analysis, three
significant predictors of INT were identified: (l) RT to judge
that the instance, or subject-concept, is a word (presumably a
measure of encoding time); (2) time to generate a superordinate
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of the instance; and (3) the tine to recognize that the predicate
concept was not a member of another category occupying the same
level in the same semantic hierarchy as itself. As Anderson and
Reder (1974) note, these findings suggest that the subject
generates a category of the instance and determines that that
category is disjoint from the presented category. Although
Anderson and Reder hypothesize that the latter part of this
"strategy" involves direct storage of the disjoint relationship
between the actual and the presented category, the findings are
also consistent with Holyoak and Glass's contradiction hypothesis.
A study by Millward, Rice, and Gorbett (1975) may be
interpreted as support for Holyoak and Glass's contention that
contradictory information retrieved from memory is used to reject
false propositions. Millward, et. al.
,
used a simple categorization
paradigm and investigated a number of variables, only one of which
is of interest here. Negative instances were selected from five
levels of dominance (determined by ordinal rank in production
frequency norms) within their respective categories. The finding
was that negative RT increased with decreasing instance-dominance,
except for a slight decrease in RT from the second- lowest to the
lowest level of dominance. On the assumption that instance- and
category-dominance are positively-correlated, these findings are
consistent with those of Anderson and Reder (1974) and thus with
Kolyoak and Glass*s (1975) contradiction hypothesis.
Two more direct sources of evidence for Kolyoak and Glass's
ideas are their own studies. Glass, Holyoak, and G'Dell (1974,
Experiment 4) investigated the pattern of RTs as a function of
the production frequency of the predicate to the quantified
subject of a proposition. Two quantifiers, "many" and "few",
were used. True propositions were those for which the predicate
completion was one given in a production task to the particular
quantifier-subject pair used in the sentence-verification task.
False "few" propositions substituted a predicate (property)
produced for a "many" completion task; false "many" propositions
were completed with predicates produced for a "few" completion
blank. For example, if a frequent completion of "Many arrows
are
" was "pointed", subjects in the verification task
would be presented the false proposition "Few arrows are pointed
For both true and false propositions, statements with high
frequency predicates were processed more quickly than those with
low frequency predicates. The results support the contention
that false propositions may be rejected on the basis of contra-
dictory information retrieved from memory. Further, on the
assumption that production frequency and subject-predicate
similarity are positively correlated (Rips, et. al.
, 1973), the
finding that "false" responses were faster for high frequency
predicates is contrary to the feature comparison model's
predictions.
Holyoak and Glass (1975 f Experiment 2) have performed
another sentence-verification experiment based on explicit
statements of the contradiction and counterexample hypotheses,
and more directly concerned with the differential predictions
of Smith, et, al.' s (1974a; 1974b) theory and their own. The
experiment will be considered in detail because it represents
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the point of departure for the present research. Only those
aspects of the experiment relevant to the present considerations
will be discussed.
The experiment may be divided into two sub-experiments
according to whether the contradiction or counterexample hypothesis
is being examined. First, the contradiction experiment used both
universal- and particular affirmative propositions. Stimuli were
selected on the basis of production frequency norms (Experiment l)
in which subjects were instructed to give false completions to
incomplete propositions of the fornn "Quantifier A are ".
For instance, if the stimulus was "All arrows are ", a
frequent, false completion would be "bows". Three levels of
predicate frequency were used! high (mean production frequency
of thirty-five percent); low (mean production frequency of five
percent); and anomalous (four percent). Anomalous predicate com-
pletions were defined as those for which the intersection of the
subject and predicate concepts was more remote than the immediate
superordinate of both. To summarize the design, only subject-
predicate pairs corresponding to the contradiction situation
were used in a two (quantifier) by three (production frequency of
the predicate) factorial design.
Holyoak and Glass expected that the shortest RTs would be
to anomalous propositions; while low production frequency
predicates should be slowest. Since false production frequency
presumably represents a manipulation of the accessibility of
subset/superset information and the feature comparison model
contends that such information is not utilized during the evalua-
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tion of a proposition, Smith, Shoben and Hips predict no effect
of false production frequency, £er se, on RT. However, false
production frequency results and ratings of subject-predicate
similarity were found to correlate positively and significantly
(r=.32). Since the feature comparison model expects false RT to
be slowed as subject-predicate similarity increases, Smith, et. al.
,
predict that RTs should be ordered anomalous to high production
frequency predicates, fastest to slowest. The pattern of results
for both universal and particular affirmative propositions confirm
Holyoak and Glass's predictions. The magnitude of the difference
between high and low production frequency predicates was 146
milliseconds for particular affirmative, and 152 milliseconds for
universal affirmative propositions.
The second subexperiment was concerned with the counter-
example hypothesis; thus, only universal affirmative propositions
constitute appropriate stimuli. Stimuli were again selected on
the basis of false completions given to incomplete propositions
of the form: "All A are n
. The frequency with which particu-
lar completions were given constituted one of the two variables
examined in this subexperiment; namely, production frequency
(high or low). In this case, production frequency was interpreted
solely as a manipulation of subject-predicate similarity. The
second variable, counterexample frequency (high or low), was
assessed on the basis of true completion responses for the same
subject-concept, but quantified by "some". As an example, a high
frequency sentence selected from the false completion norms might
be: "All flowers are roses". The counterexample to this false
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assertion, which is the most common completion of "Some flowers
are
" after "roses" ("pansies"), is produced relatively
infrequently. Thus, production frequency and counterexample
frequency were manipulated orthogonally in this subexperiment
.
Smith, et. al. (1974b) expect RT to vary as a function of
production frequency because production frequency is positively
correlated with similarity ratings. However, they predict no
effect of counterexample frequency because it represents a
manipulation of the accessibility of subset/superset information.
Holyoak and Glass predict an effect of counterexample frequency
alone because only subset/superset information will form the
basis for a negative response according to their hypothesis. In
fact, there was no effect of production frequency, but a signifi-
cant effect of counterexample frequency was found. Low counter-
example frequency propositions were an average of approximately
108 milliseconds slower than high counterexample frequency
propositions. The main effect of counterexample frequency has
been replicated by Holyoak and Glass (1975, Experiment 3);
however, a high error rate (forty-three percent in one cell of
the design) makes interpretation of the RT results of the study
difficult.
While Holyoak and Glass have demonstrated an effect on RT
to reject false propositions which cannot be attributed to subject-
predicate similarity, some questions may be raised concerning an
appropriate interpretation of their findings. Consider the
contradiction subexperiment first. Holyoak and Glass interpret
the results for high and low production frequency statements in
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this subexperiment as reflecting a common process: RT differences
as a function of production frequency are attributed to differences
in the speed with which the predicate concept is accessed in
memory from the subject concept. The process of tracing the
connection in memory between the two concepts is hypothesized to
involve generating the immediate superordinate of the subject of
the proposition, then finding that the predicate concept is an
instance of the category as well. An examination of the stimuli
used to test the contradiction hypothesis calls this conceptuali-
zation into question. Although it seems an appropriate description
of the situation for low production frequency propositions, the
majority of high production frequency propositions may be stored
directly in memory as mutually-exclusive concepts. In other words,
the fact that "A is not a 3" may be stored in memory for high
production frequency propositions; whereas this fact must be
inferred for low production frequency propositions from the fact
that "A" and "B !l have the same immediate superordinate. (Sone
typical, high production frequency subject-predicate pairs are
"chairs-tables"
,
"men-women", and "boys-girls" j some typical, low
production frequency subject-predicate pairs are "blossoms-grass",
"chairs-desks", and "women-babies".) In terms of an interpretation
of the contradiction subexperiment, what Holyoak and Glass may in
fact have demonstrated arei (l) two different ways in which
negative propositions are rejected; and (2) that "inferential"
processing takes longer than retrieval of a direct, negative
connection between the subject and predicate concepts.
A similar critique may be made with respect to the stimuli
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used in the counterexample subexperiment. High frequency counter-
example predicates appear to be fairly homogeneous across levels
of production frequency — virtually all are instances of the
subject-category and are of intermediate or low production fre-
quency, as judged by reference to the Battig and Montague (1969)
production frequency norms. However, low frequency counterexample
predicates seem quite different as a function of false production
frequency. High production frequency, low counterexample
frequency predicates are the most typical instances of the
subject-category. For example, if the subject-category is "flowers",
the high frequency predicate is "roses" and the low frequency
counterexample is presumably "pansies". On the other hand, low
production frequency, low counterexample frequency predicates
represent unusual partitions of the subject-category. For example,
two predicates paired with the subject-category "fruits" were
"citrus" and "spheres"; for "gems", they were "necklaces" and
"earrings"; and for "teachers", they were "friends" and "parents".
It is unlikely that many subjects had alternative partitions of
these categories directly-stored in memory which could serve as
easily accessible counterexamples to statements constructed from
these subject-predicate pairs. (For example, what is an alterna-
tive partition of "fruits" representing a level of abstraction
equivalent to that of "spheres"?) In terms of an interpretation
of the counterexample subexperiment, the results may reflect that
stimuli from various cells in the design may require very
different rejection strategies.
Although the appropriate interpretation of Holyoak and
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Glass's findings is unclear, their research may demonstrate an
inadequacy of the feature comparison model (Smith, et. al.
, 1974b).
It is not obvious hovr the model could be amended to handle
systematic effects of variables other than subject-predicate
similarity on negative RT. Smith, et. al. (1974b) suggest that
the second processing stage, in which only defining features of
the subject and predicate concepts are compared, may have to be
altered from an exhaustive to a self-terminating comparison
process. The process would terminate as soon as a defining
feature of the subject-concept was encountered which was not
also a defining feature of the predicate concept. However, the
defining features of the subject- and predicate-concepts should be
the same regardless of production frequency or counterexample
frequency in the Holyoak and Glass study because the predicate is
from the same category as the subject-concept (contradiction
situation) or the predicate is an instance of the subject-category
(counterexample situation). Thus, there is no basis for a self-
terminating comparison process like that proposed by Smith, et. al.
(1974b). The difficulty is Smith, et. al. 's claim that only
attributes, and not subset/superset information is being evaluated
in the sentence-verification paradigm.
While other theories of semantic memory must come to grips
with Holyoak and Glass's findings, the theory Holyoak and Glass
(1975) offer to account for their results is not consistent with
the finding that subject-predicate similarity slows negative RT.
They accept the finding that anomalous propositions are rejected
very quickly as straightforward and recognize that their theory
lacks a well-formulated mechanism to deal with this result,
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although some suggestions are offered. However, Holyoak and Glass
do not view anomalous propositions as representing an extreme
point on a continuum of subject-predicate similarity. Rather,
they see anomalous propositions as distinct from "meaningful"
propositions. Their position (Holyoak and Glass, 1975) is that
the similarity/negative RT effect can be reduced to a case of
either anomalous propositions being compared with meaningful
propositions, or a confounding of similarity with counterexample
frequency or production frequency (contradiction situation).
To summarize to this point, Holyoak and Glass have demon-
strated that variables other than similarity affect subjects'
RTs to reject false propositions. This finding raises problems
for a feature comparison model of semantic memory and suggests
that the processing of false propositions is a complicated affair.
Cn the other hand, Holyoak and Glass's view of how false
propositions are rejected fails to integrate the similarity/
negative RT effect satisfactorily. Further, questions have been
raised with respect to the appropriate interpretation of Holyoak
and Glass's (1975) findings concerning their contradiction and
counterexample hypotheses.
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Collins and Quillian: A Network Model
As we have seen, there is evidence that subjects base
negative decisions on information concerning properties shared
by the subject- and predicate-concept of the stimulus proposition
(e.g., Smith, et. al.
, 19?^b). There is also evidence that sub-
jects reject some false propositions on the basis of information
retrieved about the subset/superset relationships the subject-
and predicate-concepts are involved in (e.g., Holyoak and Glass,
1975). The feature comparison model predicts the former, but not
the latter effect; while Kolyoak and Glass predict the latter
effect, but cannot account for the semantic relatedness effect.
Collins and Quillian present a model which suggests a way in
which both of these effects might be accomodated. At its present
state of development, the model is not sufficiently we 11-formulated
to unambiguously predict the conditions of occurrence of either
effect; however, it does offer an heuristic framework within which
the two results might be considered further. Thus, those features
of the model which provide the framework will be emphasized in
the following discussion.
Three aspects of Collins and Quillian's (1969; 1970a;
1972a; 1972b; Collins and Loftus, 1975) theory are of interest.
First, their conceptualization of the memory structure is
important (Collins and Loftus, 1975)* Concepts are represented
as nodes, and relations as pathways between the nodes in the
structure. Thus, memory is viewed as an interconnected network
of information. The information in the network includes subset/
superset information as well as information about the attributes
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of concepts. Given that a particular concept is accessed in
memory, information about that concept is obtained be tracing
out along the paths which intersect at that concept-node and
retrieving the associates which are encountered. This search
process is undirected: The major processing assumption is that
when a concept is accessed in memory, a parallel spread of
activation is automatically triggered which results in the acti-
vation of neighboring concept-nodes. The speed with which these
concepts are processed is determined by the strength of the
pathway connecting them to the original concept, which, in turn,
is presumably a function of factors such as the similarity and
co-occurrence frequency of the two concepts. Finally, associates
differ in their importance to the definition of a particular
concept; thus pathways connecting concepts are tagged according
to the "criteriality" of the various associates. Griteriality
does not affect the speed of travel on the pathway, but serves
as a weight indicating the importance of a particular piece of
information during the evaluation of a proposition. Typically,
subset/superset information is highly criterial information in
Collins and Quillian's model, as it is in Kolyoak and Glass's
theory.
The second important aspect of Collins and Quillian's
(1969; Collins and Loftus, 1975) concerns their conceptualization
of how information is retrieved about a concept. Some of the
major processing notions have been noted; what is necessary is
an elaboration of what is hypothesized to occur when a test
proposition is presented for evaluation. As soon as the subject
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and predicate concepts are encoded, a parallel spread of activa-
tion is initiated from each concept. Since this process is
occurring within a network structure, there will be interconnect-
ing pathways between the two concepts. When a common associate
or intersection is found, the pathway interconnecting the subject
and predicate is traced and evaluated against the test proposition.
This brings us to the third important contention of Collins and
Quillian (1972b; Collins and Loftus, 1975). When information
relevant to the evaluation of a proposition is located in memory,
it contributes to a positive or a negative decision according to
the criteriality of the information. Thus, a false proposition
is rejected on the basis of contradictory information found in
memory, as in the Holyoak and Glass model. That is, negative
decisions are based upon the positive retrieval of disconfirming
information; rather than upon the failure to find a "match"
between information in memory and the stimulus proposition, or
between the subject- and predicate-concepts* feature lists.
According to the above model, the information in memory
relevant to a particular test proposition might be viewed as an
ordered list of propositions. Thus, the speed with which a false
proposition is rejected is a function of at least two factors
i
(1) the length of the list (number of intersecting pathways
between the subject- and predicate-concept); and (2) the position
the disconfirming information occupies in the list.^ In terms of
third factor suggested by the theory is the "distance"
between successive items on the list, to continue the metaphor.
Even if the disconfirming proposition to stimulus A and the dis-
confirming proposition to stimulus B occupy the same ordinal
position on their respective lists, proposition A and proposition
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predictions, the longer the "list", the slower negative RT will
be in general. However, list- length will be a factor only to the
extent that the position in the list of the contradictory informa-
tion is affected. This position is consistent with that of
Holyoak and Glass in that it: (l) emphasizes the importance of
subset/superset information; and (2) declares the primary determi-
nant of negative RT to be the accessibility of contradictory
information. On the other hand, the "intersecting search hypothe-
sis" generates the same, general prediction — although by a
different mechanism — as the feature comparison model with
respect to the effects of subject-predicate relatedness on negative
RT. Both Collins and Quillian and Smith, et. al.
,
predict increas-
ing negative RT with increasing semantic relatedness. A point of
distinction between the two positions is that Collins and Quillian
claim that common associates of the subject and predicate are
responsible for the effect and place the locus of effect in a
search stage of processing; whereas Smith, et. al. , attribute the
effect to the number of shared features (similarity) of the two
concepts being compared, placing emphasis on a comparison stage.
B may not be rejected with the same speed because the respective
disconfirming propositions would occupy different positions on a
ratio scale, or list. Consideration of this factor of inter-item
distance on the list may well lead to theoretical predictions
opposite to some generated by a consideration of ordinal position
and list- length alone. For example, as subject-predicate similarity
decreases, list-length decreases and, with it, negative RT. How-
ever, inter-item distance probably increases as similarity (list-
length) decreases, leading to the prediction that negative RT
should increase. Without a serious attempt to examine the relative
importance of the "list-length" versus the "inter-item distance"
variables, unambiguous predictions cannot be derived from the
Collins and Quillian model. However, these problems will be set
aside at present in order to make clear the heuristic framework
provided by the model for integrating the semantic relatedness
effect and Holyoak and Glass's findings.
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All of the research reviewed to this point is relevant to
the model being considered. The evidence supports the contention
that contradictory information is used to reject false propositions
(Anderson and Reder, 197^; Glass, et. al.
. 1 9?4; Kolyoak and Glass,
Millward, et. al.,, 1975). Less directly, the intersecting search
hypothesis is supported by evidence for the similarity/negative
RT effect on the assumption that as subject-predicate similarity
increases, the number of intersecting pathways linking the subject-
and predicate-concepts in memory (list-length) will increase; thus
more items will have to be evaluated, on the average, before a
discontinuing piece of information is found. To avoid being
redundant with previous sections, only one experiment of particular
relevance to the present model will be considered here.
The study of interest is the counterexample subexperiment
of Holyoak and Glass's (1975) Experiment 2. It is the only experi-
ment in the literature that simultaneously manipulates the two
factors — accessibility of contradictory information and subject-
predicate relatedness -- which the Collins and Quillian model
hypothesizes to be the major determinants of negative RT. Recall
that the predicted effect of counterexample frequency was found.
The model also predicts a main effect of subject-predicate related-
ness. The findings were inconclusive with respect to this
prediction. There was no effect of relatedness; however, rated
similarity of the subject and predicate concepts was shown to
account for a significant portion of the variability after variabil-
ity attributable to counterexample frequency was removed. This
finding is consistent with the network model's contention that
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relatedness is important only to the extent that it affects the
accessibility of disconfirming information.
In conclusion, the model derived from Collins and Quillian's
work (1969; 19?0a; 1970b; 1972a; 1972b; Collins and Loftus, 1975)
is probably the most successful of the three theories considered
in this review. Its success seems attributable primarily to two
assumptions it makes which are not jointly common to either the
Holyoak and Glass, or the Smith, et. al.
, theories: (l) attribute
and subset/superset information is stored with a concept in memory
and is used in the process of evaluating a proposition; and (2)
the search in memory for information about the relationship
between the subject and predicate concepts of a test proposition
proceeds from both the subject and the predicate concept, not
just from the subject concept. Although Collins and Quillian's
theory does a reasonable job of integrating the research findings
produced thus far, it is not unambiguously supported. Further,
it is not clear how much of its success is due to particular
assumptions it adopts as opposed to a lack of specification at
crucial points in the model. Thus, Collins and Quillian's
position is perhaps most fruitfully considered in terms of its
points of contrast with Holyoak and Glass's model and the feature
comparison model of Smith, Shoben, and Rips. It is within this
context that the research to be reported was developed.
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THE RESEARCH
The two experiments to be reported nay be interpreted
from two perspectives. At one level, the experiments are an
investigation of Holyoak and Glass's (1975) contradiction and
counterexample hypotheses, respectively. At a more general level,
the experiments represent a point of intersection between the
three major theories of semantic memory which have been discussed.
First, it has been noted that Holyoak and Glass have not
provided unambiguous support for their contradiction and counter-
example hypotheses. It is not clear that their subjects followed
the hypothesized "strategies" concerning how particular types of
false statements are rejected. The present experiments attempt
to clarify the situation by adopting somewhat different operational
definitions of the relevant dependent variables. Experiment 2,
which tests the counterexample hypothesis, also extends Holyoak
and Glass's investigation by examining not one but two dependent
variables which concern the distribution in memory of counter-
examples to a proposition.
Despite some difficulties in interpreting exactly what
kinds of strategies their subjects may be using, Holyoak and Glass
demonstrate that false responses are based on the positive
retrieval of information about the subset/superset relationships
of the subject- and/or predicate-concepts of the stimulus proposi-
tions — at least in some situations. At the same time, they raise
some questions about the validity of the semantic relatedness/
negative RT effect. However, their measure of semantic related-
ness is unusual; thus it is difficult to evaluate the significance
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of their finding. The present experiments re-examine the semantic
relatedness effect — in the context of an investigation of the
contradiction and counterexample hypotheses — using a traditional
measure of semantic relatedness.
The findings from the two experiments should also provide
evidence relevant to a number of issues generated by a considera-
tion of the three models of semantic memory, A comparison of the
feature comparison model with Holyoak and Glass's, and with
Collins and Quillian's positions raises two questions: What
types of information are stored in memory?; How is that information
organized? Contrasting Holyoak and Glass's model with that of
Collins and Quillian raises the question of whether the retrieval
process involves a search from both the subject- and predicate-
concept in memory, or from the subject-concept only. Finally, a
consideration of the three models taken together points up the
issue of whether the retrieval process is directed such that only
items bearing particular relationships to the subject- (and
predicate) concept are searched; or whether the search is undirected.
Of course, definitive answers cannot be given to any of these
important questions. However, the following experiments should
contribute to the existing literature bearing on these issues.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tests Holyoak and Glass's contradiction
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, when the subject- and
predicate-nouns of a proposition represent instances from the same
semantic category, the proposition will be rejected as soon as
the subject (in the experiment) retrieves the information from
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memory that the two concepts have the same immediate superordinate.
Kolyoak and Glass hypothesize that retrieval of that information
involves a search in memory from the subject-concept during which
the superordinate of that concept is generated and the predicate
concept is then found to be an instance of the same category.
However, a question was raised as to whether this was an adequate
description of how subjects processed all the propositions they
received in Holyoak and Glass's (1975» Experiment 2) experiments
or whether two different bases for rejection were used correspond-
ing to the two levels of false production frequency (Holyoak and
Glass's measure of the accessibility of contradictory information).
For instance, high production frequency propositions (e.g., "All
men are women") may have been rejected by finding the information
directly-stored in memory that the subject and predicate concepts
are mutually-exclusive ("Men are not women"). Cn the other hand,
low production frequency propositions (e.g., "All dogs are
rabbits") may well have been rejected by the hypothesized process
of generating the subject-concept's superordinate, finding that
the predicate was an instance of that category, then making the
appropriate inference. The present experiment attempts to avoid
this problem by using different techniques of stimulus collection.
In addition to manipulating the accessibility of contra-
dictory information, the rated similarity of the subject- and
predicate-concepts is varied in Experiment 1, Although Holyoak
and Glass considered the influence of this variable, they did so
in a post hoc manner and consequently their results were incon-
clusive with respect to the relative influences of the two
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variables examined — production frequency and similarity.
Thus, the design of Experiment 1 is essentially a two
by two orthogonal design, with subject-predicate similarity and
the accessibility of contradictory information ("predicate
dominance") the two independent variables. The task is a
sentence-verification task in which the stimulus sentences are
universal affirmative propositions ("All A are B") and reaction
time is the dependent variable of primary interest. With respect
to the three theories of semantic memory being considered, three
different predictions are generated: (l) Holyoak and Glass pre-
dict a main effect of predicate dominance for two reasons. First,
they hypothesize that the search process proceeds from the subject-
concept only and is unaffected by the particular predicate-concept.
Secondly, they expect that the only basis for rejecting a false
proposition in this experiment should be the contradiction "strate-
gy" since no anomalous items are included in the stimulus materials.
Because only subset/superset information is hypothesized to be
used to reject false propositions, and because the search process
is presumed to proceed from the subject-concept only, similarity
is predicted to have no effect. (2) Smith, Shoben, and Rips
( 1974b) predict a main effect of similarity. Predicate dominance
is predicted to have no effect because it represents a manipulation
of the accessibility of subset/superset information, information
which the feature model claims is not used in a sentence-verification
task. (3) Collins and Quillian predict main effects of both vari-
ables. Predicate dominance should affect RT for two reasons.
One, the Collins and Quillian model allows for a rejection
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strategy based on subject-predicate similarity which is analogous
to that of the feature model. The second reason is due to their
conceptualization of the search process. Increasing subject-
predicate similarity essentially increases the number of common
associates of the two concepts, thus increasing the amount of
information which will probably have to be evaluated before a
rejection is possible.
Method
Design : The design is a two by two by twenty-six, within-
sul ts design. Two levels of subject-predicate similarity,
two vels of predicate dominance, and twenty-six different
subject-nouns define the partitioning of the stimulus materials.
It is an unusual feature of the design of this experiment that
there is no "items 11 variable nested within the four cells defined
by the similarity and predicate dominance variables. Instead,
the twenty-six subject-nouns serve as the subjects of four dif-
ferent propositions, one corresponding to each of the four cells.
An "items' 1 variable is best defined as the interaction of the
three within-subjects variables — similarity, predicate dominance,
and subjects of the propositions.
Materials ; There were three stages in the collection of the
critical stimulus materials. First, groups of five nouns were
selected from as many different semantic categories in the
Battig and Montague (1969) norms as possible. Within each category,
a noun of intermediate production frequency was selected to serve
as a subject noun in the test propositions. Next, two pairs of
nouns were selected from the same category with the constraints
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that (l) the items within a pair were of comparable production
frequency and intuitively at different levels of similarity to
the subject-noun and (2) that the pairs of nouns represented two
extreme levels of production frequency. These four nouns would
be paired with the subject-noun to create four propositions
corresponding to the four, similarity by predicate dominance
cells. For example, the subject-noun "lead" was paired with
"steel" (high production frequency and high similarity); "gold"
(high, low); "nickel" (low, high); and "bronze" (low, low).
Forty-seven sets of four subject-predicate pairs were generated
in this manner.
Next, the subject-predicate pairs were presented to nine
subjects (graduate and undergraduate volunteers) to rate in
semantic similarity. Each subject received a booklet consisting
of pages with five or six sets of nouns on each page. Each group
of five nouns chosen together in the first stage of stimulus
collection were presented together on a page in the booklet.
Predicate nouns were randomly ordered; noun sets were randomly
assigned to a page; and pages were randomly presented to individual
subjects. Subjects were required to rate how similar the subject-
noun presented on the left-hand side of the page was to each of
the four predicate nouns presented opposite to it on the right.
A seven-point rating scale was used in which "1" was to be inter-
preted as "extremely similar" and "7" was "extremely dissimilar 11 .
On the basis of subject ratings, twenty-six sets of four noun
pairs each were selected for use in the sentence-verification task.
The resulting 104- stimulus pairs are presented in Appendix A; while
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their values on the independent variables and word-frequoncy
(Kucora and rrancia, I967) are summarized in Appendix B. Note
that the ctimull in each of the four cells of the derrl^n are
approximately equated for frequency of English language ueage
and word length.
The final sta^e in the collection of stimulus rnaturial3
was the Renoration of "true" items to serve as fillers for the
above "false" propositions. For each of the twenty-six subject-
nouns, an average of throe (no less than two nor more than four)
predicate terms were generated which would make a "true 11 state-
ment. This was to insure that subjects would not bo able to
respond on the basis of the SUbJeot-noun alone after a few blocks
of trials. In addition, fifty-six "true" items were constructed
in which the predicate noun occupied the Intuitively equivalent
level In its respective semantic hierarchy as the subject-nouns
in the critical false propositions. Further
,
twenty-four "false"
filler items were constructed in which the predicate terms
represented an abstract, relatively high level in their respective
semantic hierarchies. The reasoning behind this control was that
the predicate terms of the critical false propositions and their
corresponding true propositions represent distinct populations
with respect to the level they occupy in a semantic hierarchy, and
possibly on an abstractness-concreteness dimension. Representative
predicates for false items are "cherries", "lamps", and "plates";
for true items, they are "vegetables", "fruits", and "clothing".
The additional true and false fillers were intended to abolish
any systematic differences between true and false propositions
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that might encourage subjects to adopt a processing strategy
irrelevant to the concerns of the present study.
Twenty stimulus propositions were randomly assigned to
each block in the sentence-verification task with the following
constraints: (l) two false propositions from each of the four
cells of the experimental design appeared in each block; (2) two
additional false fillers; (3) five or six true fillers with
critical subject-nouns; and O) five or four additional true
fillers were represented in each block; and (5) a subject-noun
appeared only once in a particular block. A total of twelve
blocks of twenty trials each were generated in this manner and an
additional two practice blocks were constructed which maintained
the characteristics of the test blocks.
With respect to the two independent variables of interest
in the study, the objective measure of similarity was, of course,
the subject rating data. The predicate dominance variable is the
objective measure of the accessibility of contradictory information
about a critical proposition. The mean strength of the relation-
ship between the subject-noun and its superordinate was equated
across all four cells of the design by crossing the subject-noun
with the similarity and predicate dominance variables. The
strength of the relationship between the predicate noun and the
same superordinate was varied by selecting two pairs of predicate
nouns at two levels of production frequency (Battig and Montague,
I969) in their respective semantic category for each subject-noun,
rroceduro ; Subjects were instructed that they would be
shown many simple sentences of the form "All A are B", and the
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task was to decide whether the statement was "true" or "false"
as quickly as possible. If the statement was "true", subjects
were to pull a response trigger with their right hand; the left-
hand trigger corresponded to a "false" response.
Each subject was shown fourteen blocks of twenty proposi-
tions for evaluation. The first two blocks were practice blocks
for which no data was recorded. The remaining twelve blocks
were presented in a different random order for each subject and
the sequencing of trials within each block was random as well.
The sequence of events on each trial was as follows. First, the
words "ALL ARE" appeared, "ALL" above "ARE", on a screen in front
of the subject. After an interval of 400 milliseconds, a warning
tone of 150 milliseconds in duration was presented, followed by a
second silent interval of 400 milliseconds. Next, the subject-
noun and predicate were presented, one above the other. The
complete proposition looked as follows i ALL
SUBJECT
ARE
PREDICATE
The proposition remained in view until a response was made, which
erased the screen. If the response was correct, a two second
interval followed before the start of the next trial. If the re-
sponse was incorrect, the word "ERROR" replaced the proposition
on the screen and the two-second interval did not begin until
subjects indicated they were ready by pulling either response trig-
ger. RT was measured from the presentation of the subject and
predicate words. The presentation of trials and the sequencing of
blocks and trials was controlled by a PDP-8I computer. Subjects
were run individually and an experimental session lasted approxi-
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mately forty-five minutes.
Subjects : Twenty undergraduate volunteers from an introduc-
tory psychology course participated in the experiment for course
credit.
Results
Only data from critical false proposition trials were
considered in analyses. The set of propositions for which the
subject-noun was 11 ladles" was not included in analyses because a
number of subjects reported that they had misread that subject-
noun as "ladies". Thus, there were 100 data points per subject.
Error and RT data were each submitted to a two by two by
twenty-five, within-subjects analysis of variance. Similarity and
predicate dominance were considered fixed-effects variables (Clark,
1973) • However, since the definition of subject-nouns as a
random-effects factor means that tests of treatment effects are
conservative (Clark, 1973) • the results of analyses in which
treatment effects were tested against the subject-by-treatments
term will be reported when they differ from the results of quasi-
F computations. Quasi-F ratios were computed according to the
formula suggested by Myers (1972). In addition to the results
for the critical, false propositions reported below, a summary of
the results for the false and true filler items is presented in
Appendix C. Results of error analyses are reported first.
Errors: The overall error rate for the experiment was 8.55
percent. A summary of the error data is presented in Table 1
on the following page. As can be seen, errors are positively
correlated with reaction time. The analysis of variance demon-
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strated a number of significant effects. The subjects and subject-
nouns effects were significant (F(l9,^6)=l4. 50, p-.OOl; F(24,^6)
6.08, p-r.001, respectively). In addition, the interactions of
similarity with subject-nouns (F(24,456)=5.80), predicate dominance
with subject-nouns (F(24 f ^6)=6.28) , and similarity by predicate
dominance by subject-nouns (F(24,456)=5.20) were all significant
at the .001 level. These interactions and the main effect of
subject-nouns taken together indicate significant variability
attributable to the stimulus materials.
The theoretically interesting observations are the main
effects of similarity and predicate dominance. The effect of
similarity was significant (F* (l ,23)=1?.87, p-^.0l). There were
more errors when subject-predicate similarity was high (13.2^)
than when it was low (2.9l£). The effect of predicate dominance
did not reach significance according to quasi-F computations
(F , (l,23)=1.21, p^.l), but was significant when tested against
the subjects-by-predicate dominance term (F(l, 19)=6.95, p«=^.05).
There were more errors with low predicate dominance (10.0%) than
with high (7.1%). The interaction of similarity with predicate
dominance was not significant (F'-^l), nor were any other effects.
Table 1 t Mean reaction times and
errors (in parentheses) for
Experiment 1.
Similarity
Hiffh Low
High 1475.2 (13.0^) 1260.1 (1.2#)
Dominance Low 1600.0 (15.W 1338.9 i^M)
Reaction time : For purposes of the analysis of variance,
errors were replaced with the subjects* mean RT for the respective
^3.
similarity-by-predicate dominance cell of the design. Mean RTs
are presented in Table 1.
The results of the reaction time analysis are consistent
with the results of the error analysis. Again, the main effects
of subjects (F(19,456)=22.52, p^.OOl) and subject-nouns (F(24,
^56)=3.19» p-^.001) arc significant. The similarity-by-subject
nouns (F(24,^56)=3.68), predicate dominance-by-subject nouns
and similarity-by-predicate dominance-by-
subject nouns (F(24,285)=2.56) interactions all are significant
at the .001 level.
The main effects of both similarity (F f (l f 2?)=20.21,
p-^.001) and predicate dominance (F 1 (l
,
37)=^. 70, p<»05) are
significant. Subjects are 102 milliseconds faster to reject high
predicate dominance propositions, and are 238 milliseconds faster
to reject propositions of low subject-predicate similarity. The
only remaining significant effect is the interaction of similarity
with subjects (F(l9,^6)=1.77. The significant interac-
tion is attributable primarily to variability in the size of the
similarity effect between subjects rather than to differences in
its direction. Nineteen of twenty subjects showed slower reaction
times when similarity was high than when it was low,
Discussion
At this point, the results of Experiment 1 will be
interpreted only with respect to the contradiction hypothesis of
Holyoak and Glass. The implications of the results for the three
models of semantic memory reviewed and the Issues thoy raise will
be postponed until the second experiment is considered.
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Holyoak and Glass f s contradiction hypothesis predicts
that when the subject and predicate of a proposition are instances
of the same semantic category, subjects* recognition of this fact
is the basis for their rejection of the proposition. The present
study varies the accessibility of this information by varying the
strength of the relationship between the predicate instance and
its immediate superordinate (predicate dominance), while holding
the subject-noun constant. The finding that RT and errors increase
as predicate dominance decreases thus supports the contradiction
hypothesis.
The finding that similarity had a large effect on both RT
and error rate refutes Holyoak and Glass's suggestion that previous
demonstrations of slower negative RT with increasing subject-
predicate similarity (e.g., Smith, et. al.
,
1974b; Glass, et. al.
,
19?4) are due to: (l) a confounding of similarity with variables
determining the accessibility of superset/subset information
common to the subject- and predicate-concepts of a proposition;
and/or (2) comparisons of RTs to reject meaningful "false" propo-
sitions (high similarity) with anomalous propositions (low simi-
larity), which presumably represent a distinct population of
stimuli. Neither criticism can be applied to the present
experiment. However, while the similarity effect in the present
experiment does not appear attributable to a confounding with
other potentially significant factors, the locus of its effect is
not clear. Two possibilities are suggested by the feature
comparison model and Collins and Quillian's theory, respectively.
First, the effect of similarity may indicate that subjects do use
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a processing strategy similar to that hypothesized by Smith, et,
aJU_ (1974b). That is, judgments of subject-predicate similarity
are being used as a basis for response in the experimental task.
An observation which is inconsistent with this hypothesis is that
the RTs for errors on critical false items are quite long (2023
milliseconds) and thus could not be based on a fast computation
of subject-predicate similarity as the feature comparison model
suggests. The second possibility is that similarity has its
effect not on the subjects' processing strategies, but at a
more fundamental level of processing. Specifically, given an
hypothesized search process which locates any information common
to the subject- and predicate-concept during the evaluation of a
proposition (e.g., Collins and Quillian, 1969)1 high similarity
>
will slow negative RT "because much irrelevant information will
have to "be considered before some relevant information is found
which will result in the proposition's rejection. Unfortunately,
the present experiments are not designed to distinguish conclu-
sively between these alternatives, although there will be further
discussion of this issue in the general discussion section.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 tests Kolyoak and Glass's counterexample
hypothesis. This hypothesis states that when subjects are
presented with a universal proposition in which the subject term
is the superordinate of the predicate term (e.g., "All animals
are dogs"), they will reject the assertion on the basis of finding
in memory an instance of the subject-category which is not the
predicate-concept (e.g., "cat"). Holyoak and Glass hypothesize
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that the primary determinant of RT in this situation is accessi-
bility of the most accessible counterexample, which is measured
in the present experiment by production frequency (Eattig and
Montague, 1969). Although Holyoak and Glass have provided
evidence for the counterexample hypothesis, questions were
raised concerning whether there were qualitative differences
within their stimulus sample corresponding to the various cells
of their experimental design. For instance, one cell (high
production frequency, high counterexample frequency) included the
items: "All birds are robins" and "All fruits are oranges";
while another cell (low, low) included stimuli which partitioned
the same subject-category in unusual ways — ways which subjects
may not have stored directly in memory: "All birds are flyers"
and "All fruits are spheres". The potential problem is that these
two types of false propositions may require different rejection
strategies. For example, the first two statements may be rejected
by the strategy proposed by Holyoak and Glass. On the other hand,
the latter two statements seem to require an extra processing
step 1 subjects do not have stored alternatives to the above two
predicate partitions at comparable levels of abstraction — they
probably do not explicitly categorize a subclass of nonspheres or
nonflyers, for instance. Consequently, they probably must retrieve
instances of the subject-categories and then determine whether
each instance may be classified as a member of the predicate-
category as well. Alternatively, rather than retrieving exemplars
which may or may not turn out to be counterexamples of the propo-
sition, subjects may use a more "analytic" rejection strategy for
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these abstract propositions. For example, they might reason that
"citrus" denotes a class of fruits, therefore there must be other
types of fruits. The present experiment attempts to insure that
subjects use a consistent rejection strategy by making "counter-
example frequency" a between-categories variable, thus allowing
similar predicate-category partitions of all the semantic cate-
gories used as subject-nouns.
The experiment is also concerned with a second variable
which may influence time to retrieve a counterexample to a false
proposition. While the primary definition of counterexample
frequency is that proposed by Holyoak and Glass — the frequency
of occurrence of the most frequently produced instance of the
subject-category (Battig and Montague, 1969)1 the number of highly
accessible counterexamples to a statement may affect RT. Thus a
second definition of counterexample frequency adopted is the number
of instances of a subject-category with a production frequency of
fifty percent or higher (Battig and Montague, I969).
Finally, the analog of the similarity variable of
Experiment 1 is included in the present experiment. "Typicality"
(of the predicate as an instance of the subject-category) is
included as a variable for the same reasons as in Experiment 1.
The predictions of the three theories of semantic memory
are the same as in Experiment li (l) Holyoak and Glass predict a
main effect of counterexample frequency only; (2) the feature
comparison model predicts a main effect of typicality only; and
(3) the network model of Collins and Quillian predicts main effects
of both variables.
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Method
Desi£7ij The design of the present experiment is the same for
each definition of counterexample frequency. In each case, the
design is essentially a two-by-two, within subjects design. •
Typicality and counterexample frequency cross and are considered
fixed effects. In addition, twenty-four propositions are nested
within each cell defined by the crossing of typicality and
counterexample frequency. This "items" variable is considered a
random effects variable, as is the subjects variable.
Materials
: Stimulus materials were selected from the Battig
and Montague (1969) production frequency norms. The first step
in the collection procedures involved identifying all the cate-
gories in the norms which could be labelled with a familiar, one-
word title. (However, the categories "cities", "states" and
"colleges" were excluded from consideration because it was felt
that there would be too much variability in the normative
structures of these categories between different subject popula-
tions.) Thirty categories were selected by this criterion to
serve as the subject-nouns in the critical stimulus propositions.
They were divided into two groups of fifteen categories each
corresponding to the two levels of counterexample frequency
(obviously, which categories fell into which level depended upon
which definition of counterexample frequency was being examined
at the time).
The next step was to select predicate-instances to be
paired with the subject-categories. As many pairs of instances
were selected as could be found for each of the thirty subject-
categories which satisfied the following criteria i (l) the two
instances be of approximately equivalent, and preferably intermed-
iate levels of production frequency; (2) the two instances be
intuitively of two different levels of "typicality" as examples
of the category from which they were selected; (3) no instance
was to be among the four most-frequently given instances of its
category (only one predicate was produced by more than fifty
percent of Battig and Montague's subjects — "potato" was given
as an instance of the category "vegetables" by fifty-one percent
of their subjects).
After pairs of instances were selected, stimuli were
prepared for presentation to subjects who were to rate instances
for typicality. Categories and instances were grouped together
and the order of instances was randomized within each category
group. Category groups were randomly assigned to pages, six or
seven groups to a page, and pages were randomized for each
separate booklet. The same nine subjects who did the similarity
ratings in Experiment 1 did the typicality ratings in Experiment
2. Subjects were asked to rate how typical each instance was as
a member of the category it was paired with. A seven point scale
was used in which "1" meant "extremely typical" and "?" meant
"extremely atypical". On the basis of these data, one or two
pairs of predicate-instances were selected to be paired with each
subject-category selected in the first stage of stimulus collection
Thus, the two groups of stimuli already classified according to
counterexample frequency were further subdivided into two groups
on the basis of typicality ratings, completing the four cells of
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the basic experimental design: high counterexample frequency,
high typicality (e.g., "All furniture are divans"); high, low
(furniture - stereos); lew, high (ships - yachts); and low, low
(ships - canoes). A total of ninety-six category- instance pairs
were generated, twenty-four per cell. From these items, ninety-
six propositions were created of the form: "All category are
instance"
. Critical stimuli used in Experiment 2 and summaries
of their characteristics are presented in Appendices F through I.
After the critical stimuli were constructed, "filler"
items were generated. Since the same subject-noun was used to
construct two or four critical false propositions, some true
items had to be generated which used the same subject-nouns. This
was a difficult task since the subject-nouns represented semantic
categories at relatively high levels of abstraction. For example,
it is difficult to generate four different predicates which make
the incomplete proposition "All professions are " true.
Only half (forty-three) as many true fillers could be generated as
there were critical false items. Since no comparisons were
planned between "true" and "false" responses, the two-to-one ratio
of false to true items was accepted.
In addition to the above filler items, sixteen more false
and eight more true filler propositions were constructed. These
additional items were included for the same reasons as in Experi-
ment 1: (l) to prevent subjects from responding on the basis of
predicate terms alone, which were primarily abstract (high level
superordinates) for the true items and concrete concepts (common
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objects) for the critical false stimuli; and (2) to prevent the
same predicate term from appearing repeatedly in true propositions
only (e.g., "objects" was the predicate for three true proposi-
tions).
After the stimuli had been generated, eight test blocks
of twenty-one trials each were constructed. Each block contained:
(l) twelve critical false propositions, three from each of the
four cells of the design (the primary definition of counterexample
frequency was adopted in defining the cells); (2) two false fillers
and (3) seven true fillers. Stimulus propositions were randomly
assigned to blocks with these constraints plus the additional
limitation that a particular subject of a proposition appear no
more than once in a block. Finally, an additional two blocks of
twenty-one trials each were constructed in accordance with the
characteristics of the test blocks to serve as practice blocks
in the sentence-verification task.
Procedure : The procedure was the same as that for Experiment
1 with the exceptions that there were only eight rather than twelve
test blocks; there were twenty-one instead of twenty trials per
block; and there was no warning tone presented during trials.
Subjects: Twenty-one subjects from an introductory psychology
course participated for course credit.
Results
The results will be reported in two parts corresponding to
the two definitions of counterexample frequency. A summary of the
results for the true and false filler propositions is presented
in Appendix J
.
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Definition 1 (single counterexample) : This section reports the
results when counterexample frequency is defined as the produc-
tion frequency of the most frequently given instance of the
subject-category. These results are summarized in Table 2. •
Table 2 t Mean reaction times and
errors (in parentheses) for the
primary definition of counter-
example frequency in Experiment 2.
Typicality
High Low
Counterexample His^ 1290.*+ (2.7%) 1214.7 (0.8#)
Frequency Low 12^, 9 (3.6^) 1265.9 (2.0fo)
Errors: The overall error rate was only 2.23 percent, but
the pattern of errors was consistent between subjects. The error
data was analyzed with counterexample frequency and typicality
considered fixed effects, and subjects and items nested within
counterexample frequency and typicality considered random effects.
The analysis of variance showed significant effects of subjects
(F(20,1840)=2.33, P^.Ol), items (F(92, 1840>1.46, p-^.05), and
typicality (F* (l ,29)=5.74, p^.025). There were more errors when
typicality was high (3.6$) than when it was low (1,2$). The
effect of counterexample frequency was not significant (F f (l,29)=
1.92, p^.l). None of the interactions were significant.
Reaction times : The reaction time data was submitted to a
two (counterexample frequency) by two (typicality) by twenty-four
(items) by twenty-one (subjects) analysis of variance. Counter-
example frequency, typicality, and items nested within counter-
example frequency and typicality were within-subjects variables.
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Counterexample frequency and typicality were considered fixed
effects; items and subjects were considered random effects
variables. Errors were replaced with the subject's mean Eft for
the appropriate counterexample frequency by typicality cell.
The results of the RT analysis were consistent with
those of the error analysis. The main effects of subjects
(F(20,i795)=4l.51
l p^.OOl) and items (F(92.1795)"1.96, p-s.00l)
were significant. With respect to the variables of interest, two
sets of F-ratio calculations were performed for each variable.
First, quasi-F (Myers, 1972) ratios were calculated for each
variable. If the result was significant at the .05 level or
beyond, the effect was considered significant. However, if the
effect failed to reach significance by quasi-F computations, a
second criterion for acceptance was applied. Forster and Dickin-
son (1976) have demonstrated that under some conditions, quasi-F
ratios represent conservative approximations to standard alpha
levels. One such condition cited by Forster and Dickinson (1976)
occurs when the subjects-by-treatments effect and/or the main
effect of "items" (two, potential error terms against which an
effect might be tested) are small. In this situation, they
suggest that the most accurate test of whether an effect is sig-
nificant (p^.05) or not is to test the effect of interest against
the subjects-by- treatments effect and against the effect of items.
If both F-ratios exceed the .05 level, the effect is considered
si nnifleant . This second criterion will be referred to as the
joint criterion (Forster and Dickinson, 1976).
By quasi-F computations, the main effect of typicality is
5*.
marginally significant (F»(l,42)=3.77, P^.07). Since the subject-
by-typicality interaction effect does not deviate significantly
from zero (F(20,1795)=1.10, p^.l), the joint criterion for
acceptance was applied. The effect of typicality is significant
when tested against both the subjects-by-typicality effect
(F(l,20)=7.08, p^.01) and the effect of items (F(l,92)=3.96,
p-^.05). Subjects were fifty-two milliseconds slower when
typicality was high than when it was low.
The effect of counterexample frequency does not attain
significance by either criteria: neither when tested by the
quasi-F procedure (F* (l ,4)=1 .46, p^.l); nor when tested against
the subjects-by-counterexample frequency effect (F(l,20)=3. 56,
p^.08) or items effect (F(l
,
92)=1 .22, p^.l). No other effects
approached significance.
Definition 2 (many counterexamples) t This section gives the
results when counterexample frequency is defined as the number
of instances of the subject-category with a production frequency
value of fifty percent or higher in the Battig and Montague norms
(1969). For this definition of counterexample frequency, some of
the propositions switched levels of counterexample frequency from
the first definition of counterexample frequency. The items
within levels of typicality stayed the same, of course, The
results are summarized in Table 3 on the following page.
Errors: The error data were submitted to an analysis of
variance in which subjects and items were considered random
effects and typicality and counterexample frequency were fixed
effects. All treatment effects were considered within-subjects
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Table 3 : Mean RT and errors
(in parentheses) for the second
definition of counterexample
frequency in Experiment 2.
Typicality
High Low
Counterexample
Frequency
High 1259.? (2.2%) 1213.3 (0.8#)
Low 132^.4 (4. 0£) 1267.1 (2.0#)
variables.
Both main effects of items and subjects were signficant
(F(92,18*K>)-1.43, P^.05j F(20,l840)=2.33, P^.Ql, respectively).
The effect of typicality was significant (F' (l,28)=5.88, p^.025);
significant by quasi-F computations (F , (l,29)=3.46, p-=,08). The
conjoint criterion test is applicable here (the subjects-by-
counterexample frequency interaction was not significant (F(20,
1840)=1.09, P^.l). When tested against the subjects-by-
counterexample frequency term, the effect was significant
(F(l,20)=4.84 t p^.05). However, when tested against the items
term, counterexample frequency is only marginally significant
(F(l,92)=3.69, p-^.07). There tends to be more errors when
counterexample frequency is low (3.0%) than when it is high (1.5%).
Reaction times : Errors were replaced with the subject's mean
RTs for the appropriate cell of the design for the purpose of the
analysis of the reaction time data. The analysis of variance
model was the same as that used for all prior analyses. The
results are generally consistent with those for the error analysis.
Subjects (F(20, 1795)^1. 88, p^.OOl) and items (f(92,1795H-93i
p-sr.OOl) were both significant effects.
while the effect of counterexample frequency was marginally
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The effect of typicality was marginally significant by
quasi-F computations (F' (1,41)^.01, p-.06). Again, the subjects-
by-typicality effect is small (F(20 i 1795H.07) i p^.l), thus the
joint criterion for significance was applied. The typicality
effect is significant when tested against the subjects- by-typical-
ity effect (F(l f 20)=7.49, P^.05) and when tested against the
items term (F(l t 92)*4.17, P-^.05).
A similar situation applies for the effect of counter-
example frequency. The effect of counterexample frequency is
marginally significant by quasi-F computations (F f (l,37)=3.85, p-^
•08), The subjects-by-counterexample frequency effect is signifi-
cantly different from zero (F(20, 1795)=! .78, P-^.05), but is
relatively small. 5 When counterexample frequency is tested
against the subjects-by-counterexample frequency effect, it is
significant (F(l ,20)=5.86, p-^.025). Counterexample frequency is
also significant when tested against the items term (F(l,92)=
5.^0, p^.025). Subjects were fifty-nine milliseconds faster to
reject high counterexample frequency propositions than they are to
reject low counterexample frequency propositions • No other effects
were significant.
A summary of the results of Experiment 2 is in order.
First, high typicality slows RT and results in more errors.
Second, when counterexample frequency is defined as the production
frequency of the most frequently given instance of the subject-
5The variability attributable to the subjects-by-
counterexample frequency effect is small 1 0SxUF = 2,753 (Kyers,
1972). By way of comparison, the combined contribution of error
and the subjects-by-items components amounts to 169,772.
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category, the effect of counterexample frequency is not signifi-
cant (although errors and RT tend to decrease as counterexample
frequency increases). However, when counterexample freauency is
defined in terms of the number of highly-accessible counterexample,
to a proposition, the main effect of counterexample frequency is
significant in the RT analysis: RT is faster and errors tend to
be fewer when counterexample frequency is high than when it is
low. Finally, a significant interaction of subjects and
counterexample frequency (definition 2) qualifies interpretation
of the main effect of counterexample frequency: one third of
the subjects were slower when counterexample frequency was high
than when it was low.
Discussion
At this point, the discussion will be restricted to an
interpretation of the results with respect to Holyoak and Glass's
counterexample hypothesis.
Holyoak and Glass contend that universal propositions
in which the subject term is a semantic category to which the
predicate belongs (e.g., "All animals are cats") are rejected
when a counterexample to the statement is found in memory. This
hypothesis is supported by the finding that subjects are faster
to reject propositions for which there are many, highly-accessible
counterexamples, and they tend to make fewer errors in doing so.
The nature of the support for the counterexample hypothesis pre-
sented here is different from that reported by Holyoak and Glass.
Holyoak and Glass found an effect of counterexample frequency
defined in terms of the production frequency of the single, most
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accessible instance of the subject-category. The present experi-
ment analyzed the data according to this definition of counter-
example frequency with inconclusive results. It is clear that
the number of frequently produced instances of the subject-category,
rather than the frequency of the most frequently produced instance,
was the better predictor of RT in the present experiment. What is
not clear is whether this result is indicative of the nature of the
processes underlying performance in the task; or whether the
former normative measure is simply a more stable predictor of the
speed with which an individual subject will retrieve a single
counterexample to a false proposition.
The finding that typicality slows the rejection of false
propositions is consistent with the findings of Experiment 1 and
with the literature in general (e.g., Smith, et. al.
,
1974b;
Glass, et. al.
, 1974). The interpretation of this result is the
same as that given for the similarity effect found in Experiment
1; namely, that the effect is a legitimate one. The question of
the locus of the effect was raised in the discussion section of
Experiment 1. The present experiment allows some speculation on
the two suggested alternatives. However, since the fundamental
question of the nature of the memory search process is involved,
this discussion will be presented in the final section of the paper.
Finally, the two-way interaction of counterexample frequency
with subjects deserves some note. This result suggests that sub-
jects may have used different strategies of processing in performing
the experimental task. This would not be surprising given that two-
thirds of the propositions were "false" and in almost all of the
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false items the predicate term was an instance of the category
denoted by the subject term. This fact naturally produced a
strong bias to respond "false" (subjects took an average of 1516
milliseconds and had a 16.1 percent error rate on true propositions),
which probably acted to "level" the counterexample frequency and
typicality effects. It would be interesting to investigate the
context sensitivity of the interaction effects by using an equal
number of true and false propositions and including additional
false items which must be rejected on grounds other than the
counterexample strategy.
Both experiments have been described and the implications
of their results have been considered with respect to two
rejection strategies proposed by Holyoak and Glass. It is now
time to consider the general theoretical implications of the
findings of the two experiments.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
A consistent package of results emerges from Experiments
1 and 2. Each experiment supports the hypothesis it is designed
to test. Experiment i provides evidence for the contradiction
hypothesis, while Experiment 2 supports the counterexample
hypothesis. In doing so, they demonstrate that subjects utilize
information about the subset/superset relationships existing
between the subject and predicate terms in the process of
evaluating a proposition. Both experiments also demonstrate
effects of subject-predicate similarity on negative RT» as
subject-predicate similarity increases, RT and errors increase
as well. Overall, this pattern of results supports Collins and
Quillian's network model of semantic memory while demonstrating
deficiencies in Holyoak and Glass 1 s conceptualization and in the
feature comparison model of Smith, Shoben and Rips. The interest-
ing questions concern the nature of the deficiencies: What makes
the Collins and Quillian model successful? Although the present
study is not designed to provide a conclusive answer to this
question, it allows some speculation.
Memory Structure
The general issue of the structure of semantic memory is
addressed by the findings of the study. This issue may be set in
the context of a comparison of Collins and Quillian's theory and
the feature comparison model.
Contrary to the feature comparison model's contentions,
the present experiment indicates that information about a concept's
subset/superset relationships is stored in memory and is used in a
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sentence-verification task. Farther, this information must be
organized such that rapid access is provided to it. Both the
contradiction and the counterexample strategy are based on the
use of information about indirect relationships between the
subject and predicate of a proposition. The contradiction strategy
uses information about the subject and predicate's relationship to
a third concept, their common superordinate. The counterexample
strategy is based on the use of information related directly to
the subject-concept only. A feature model of semantic memory
structure is well-adapted to explain decisions based upon the
evaluation of direct relationships between explicitly presented
concepts, but it cannot easily provide an account of decisions
based on indirect relationships between two concepts. The major
difficulty would seem to be its requirement that concepts be
processed in terms of their elementary concepts at the level
which labels the concept, e.g., "Winston Churchill" and "Great
Eritain". Rather, all relationships between concepts must be
inferred from "match-mismatch" relationships between the features
of which they are composed. Thus the feature model's conceptual-
ization of the structure of semantic memory places great restric-
tions on the flexibility of any processing system operating
within it.
The success of Collins and Quillian's model thus seems
attributable — at least in part — to the fact that it docs not
make a structural distinction between "features" and "concepts";
thus it allows much greater processing flexibility than does the
feature comparison model. A concept is described not only in
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terms of its features, tut also in terms of its relationships to
other concepts. "Features" are simply concepts with particular
types of relationships to other concepts.
Memory Process
The study also bears on issues of semantic memory process.
^
Specifically, the results are relevant to questions concerning I
retrieval and decision processes in semantic memory. We can be
fairly certain that the effects demonstrated in the two experi-
ments were located in these later stages of processing as opposed
to an encoding stage of processing for several reasons. First,
word length and frequency of English language usage was controlled
across levels of the independent variables in each experiment.
Second, although Meyer (1973a) has demonstrated semantic-related-
ness effects at encoding, the present experiments show an effect
of similarity opposite to that demonstrated by Meyer i negative
KT was inhibited by subject-predicate similarity, not facilitated.
Finally, the effects of similarity are much larger than those
reported by Meyer, at least in Experiment 1 (238 milliseconds).
While the locus of effects in the two experiments is thus
attributable to later stages of processing, it is difficult to
isolate the locus more narrowly. Specifically, the effects
could be at a memory retrieval stage, or at a decision stage of
processing, or both.
^The model of processing implicitly accepted in this
discussion is one which hypothesizes a series of relatively
well-distinguished stages. Those stages and the order in which
they handle information are: encoding; memory search, including
some sort of mechanism to evaluate retrieved information;
decision; and response execution.
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Subject-predicate similarity (or typicality) affected
reaction time in both experiments. Two alternative explanations
of this effect have been offered i subject-predicate similarity
has its effect on decision certainty (e.g., 3mith, ot. al.
, 197^b)
;
or similarity slows negative HT by resulting in the retrieval of
much information which is irrelevant to the evaluation of the
proposition (e.g., Collins and Quillian, 19o9). 7 Two observations
arpue against the hypothesis that similarity was the basis for
decisions in the present study. First, according to the feature
comparison model, all errors result from first-stage processing —
errors occur when the degree of subject-predicate similarity (high
or low) contradicts the usual subject-predicate relationship for
a proposition with a particular truth value. Thus, error HTs
should be short, but in both experiments they were quite long.
Second, if a processing strategy is based upon rapid judgment of
subject-predicate similarity, similarity must be confounded with
truth value if the strategy is to be at all successful. Although
no subject ratinge of subject-predicate similarity were obtained
for true propositions, it is unlikely that similarity and truth
value were confounded in either experiment since the range of
similarity for false propositions was extreme. Thus, it seems
unlikely that information about subject-predicate similarity
?Some models of the decision process are consistent with
Collins and Quillian' s hypothesis; specifically, those decision
models which state that irrelevant information is not filtered
before a decision stage of processing is entered. For present
purposes, I have adopted a working model which breaks down
processing into separate evaluation and decision stages where
the evaluation stage decides whether the Information is relevant
or irrelevant and the decision stage simply decides whether the
relevant information is sufficient for a positive or nogativo
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formed the basis for a decision in the present experiments; rather,
it represented readily accessible, but largely irrelevant infer-
mat ion.
The preceding analysis suggests that much irrelevant infor-
mation is retrieved during the evaluation of a proposition. This
observation, in turn, suggests that the search process governing
retrieval of information from memory is not restricted within
narrow limits in the sense that at least two types of information
about subject- and predicate-concepts are being retrieved in the
experimental task. Subjects process information concerning both
the similarity (irrelevant "property" information) and subset/
superset (relevant) relationships of the subject- and predicate-
concepts. Other researchers have also suggested that subjects
have little control over the directions their memory searches
take. For example, subjects do not seem capable of restricting
the search process to newly-acquired information about a concept
in an episodic memory task; rather, the search process is evidently
influenced by pre-experimental associations as well as experimen-
tally-introduced associations (Anderson, 1975; Perlmutter, Harsip,
and Myers, 1976). Also, when asked to produce instances of a
category under time pressure, subjects sometimes mistakenly produce
related noninstances even though they are quickly aware of their
errors (Collins and Loftus, 1975)- These findings indicate an
response. Beyond this consideration however, the distinction to
be made between Smith, Shoben, and Rips and Collins and Quillian
is that the former model hypothesizes that similarity information
forms the basis for semantic decisions; while Collins and Quillian
consider similarity information to be irrelevant — in most cases
— to such decisions.
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undirected search process (or search process with very little
control) which seems inefficient in that it results in the re-
trieval of much irrelevant information. In the present study, a
more efficient, directed search process would have considered
only subset/superset relationships between the subject- and
predicate-concepts. However, while such a strategy is logically
possible in most categorization experiments, it would not be
feasible in most linguistic (conservational) situations. This is
because a directed search process depends upon the very informa-
tion to give it direction that a search process is designed to
locate so that a statement may be comprehended and evaluated; that
is, it assumes the very knowledge it is designed to find.
Turning to the remaining effect of interest in Experiments
1 and 2, respectively, the most straightforward interpretation of
the predicate dominance and counterexample frequency effects is
that they occur at the retrieval stage. This is because both
variables represent a manipulation of the accessibility of infor-
mation which disconfirms a proposition. However, there is some
indication in Experiment 2 that the decision stage may be indirect-
ly responsible for the counterexample frequency effect also.
Although the retrieval of a single counterexample logically should
be sufficient for the rejection of a proposition, it was found
that the number of highly accessible counterexamples to a proposi-
tion (definition 2) was a better predictor of HT than the produc-
tion frequency of the single most frequent counterexample (defini-
tion l). This finding may indicate nothing more than that defini-
tion 2 was a better measure of the production frequency of the
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single most frequent counterexample for a random, individual
subject. However, if the results are not artifactual, they may
indicate that subjects are cautious in their decision-making,
often delaying their response to a proposition until a couple of
counterexamples have been retrieved. On the other hand, perhaps
one counterexample is sufficient for a decision and the findings
of Experiment 2 can be explained entirely in terms of the nature
of the search process.
Definition 1 of counterexample frequency implicitly
assumes that the retrieval of information about a proposition
involves a search from the subject-concept only and is unaffected
by the particular predicate-concept with which it is paired
(Holyoak and Glass, 1975) • Neither the feature comparison model
(Smith, et. al.
,
1974b) nor the network model (Collins and Quillian,
I969) accepts this assumption, proposing instead that the search
proceeds from both the subject- and predicate-concept. If this is
so, then the first instance of the subject-category retrieved may
not be the single most frequent instance of the category, but the
instance most strongly associated to the subject-category and
predicate-instance combined. This single counterexample may or
may not be the most frequent instance of the category (definition
l), but more likely than not would be among the top few instances
of the category (definition 2).
Loftus (1973) has conducted a categorization experiment
which lends some support to the hypothesis that the search process
is bidirectional, proceeding simultaneously from the subject- and
predicate-concept in memory. She found that instance-dominance
(the strength of the association from a category to an instance)
and category-dominance (the strength of the instance-to-category
association) each account for significant portions of the positive
RT variance. If the unidirectional search hypothesis was correct,
only category-dominance should have affected RT. In the present
study, the finding that subject-predicate relatedness affected
RT even though the accessibility of subset/superset (disconfirm-
ing) information (predicate dominance and counterexample frequency)
was held constant supports the bidirectional search hypothesis.
A bidirectional search mechanism would seem to necessitate
more processing capacity than a unidirectional search mechanism.
However, the advantages of the bidirectional search outweigh this
apparent disadvantage. Given that many semantic interpretations
are available for a particular lexical item, a bidirectional
search is well-adapted to the task of identifying the intended
sense of a word because it is designed to quickly determine what
semantic connections exist between lexical items in a sentence,
for example. By way of contrast, a unidirectional search does
not take into account the fact that it is trying to establish a
connection between a subject-concept and a particular predicate.
Rather, a search originating from a particular concept in memory
will locate associations to that concept in the same order regard-
less of the predicate- paired with the subject-concept. A second,
related advantage of a bidirectional search concerns its ability
to use context to disambiguate words. Specifically, a bidirection-
al search provides for the use of following information to disam-
biguate preceding lexical items. On the other hand, a unidirec-
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tlonal search requires that comprehension proceed only in a
forward direction during the processing of linguistic information.
In sum, a bidirectional search is clearly a more flexible search
mechanism for linguistic processing than a unidirectional search
mechanism. Further, there is some empirical support for the
bidirectional search hypothesis in the work of Loftus (1973) and
in the finding of the present study that subject-predicate re-
latedness affected RT even though the accessibility of discon-
firming information (measured in a production task) was held
constant across levels of relatedness.
To conclude, the present study has provided evidence for
two ways in which false propositions are rejected in a sentence-
verification task (Holyoak and Glass, 1975). Also, it substan-
tiates the similarity/negative RT effect reported by other
investigators (e.g., Smith, et. al.
,
1974b; Glass, et. al.
, 1974).
Further, some circumstantial evidence has been collected concerning
some fundamental questions about the nature of semantic memory
structure and process. However, the experiments raise more
questions than they answer. Some of the important, interrelated
issues to be investigated are: How conscious are the "strategies"
of rejection investigated in this study?; Can their use be manipu-
lated by altering the context within which they are called?; Can
other rejection strategies be identified?; If, as suggested, the
search process is undirected and proceeds from both the subject-
and predicate-concept simultaneously, then what is the nature of
the mechanism which evaluates retrieved information and decides
upon a response?
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Appendix A
Critical Stimuli for Experiment 1
Hi (rh Dominance, High Dominance, Low Dominance, Low Dominance
SiffiJfiSl Hlfth Similarity Low Similarity High Similarity Low Similarity
Lead Steel Gold Nickel Bronze
Jaguars Timers Cows Pn 11 + hnr «aX i 'IP f £> nonKeys
Blizzards Hurricanes Tornadoes Gales Twisters
Benches Sofas Lamps Divans Pictures
Surfing r% a aSwimming Tennis Diving Hunting
Admirals Generals Privates Marshals Cadets
Bankers Lawyers Doctors Art leto
Skunks Gats Elephants Beavera Turtles
Suicides Murders Rapes Homicides Treason
Polo rn aTennis Football Pool Boxing
Prunes Grapes Poaches Figa Mangos
Vests Shirt3 Socks Suit8 Belts
irolleys Busses Trucks Subways Sleds
Banjos Violins Trumpets Fiddles Bugles
Piccolos Flutes Pianos Recorders Bong03
Dolphins Sharks Trout Marlins Shrimps
Ladles Spoons Forks Cups Plates
Axes Hammers Nails Hatchets Ladders
Raisins Cherries Bananas Berries Molons
Termites Ants Bees Ticks Hornets
Turnips Potatoes Corn Beets Parsley
Girdles Pants Blouses Shorts Boots
Arrows Knives Rifles Lances Missiles
Buzzards Eagles Robins Falcons Jays
Finches Sparrows Eagles Swallows Chickens
Parsnips Carrot Beans Turnips Parsley
Appendix B
Summary of Stimulus Characteristics for Experiment 1
Dominance
Similarity
High Low
High 288 25 157
Low 2?4 24 149
281 25
Mean Eattig-Kontague values (1969) for the
predicate nouns in Experiment 1. Each num-
ber represents the mean number of subjects
producing the predicate noun as an instance
of its respective category in the Battig
and Montague (1969) study. These figures
represent the measure of predicate dominance
in Experiment 1.
Dominance
High Low
Similarity
Hieh 2.93 2.93
Low 5-39 5.50 5A5
4.16 4.22
Mean subject-predicate similarity ratings
for Experiment 1.
Dominance
High Low
— .
... ..
High 42.1 34TI 38.5
Similarity
Low 32.1 31.0 31.6
37.1 32.8
Mean frequency of English language usage
(Kucera and Francis, 196?) of the predi-
cate nouns in Experiment 1.
Appendix G
Sunnary of Results for Filler Items in Experiment 1
Reaction Time Number of Errors
1352 milliseconds 39 (5.0%)
Summary of results for the false, filler
propositions in Experiment 1.
Reaction Time Number of Errors
1396 milliseconds 195 (7*5%)
Summary of results for the true propositions
in Experiment 1
.
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Appendix D
Analysis of Variance of Error Data for Experiment 1
Source of Variance df MS F p
SIMILARITY (fixed)
DOMINANCE (fixed)
PROPOSITION (random)
SUBJECTS (random)
1
24
19
6.38
.39
.87
17.87*
1.21*
6.08
14.50
.001
.001
.001
SIM x DOM
SIM x PROP
SIM x S
DOM x PROP
DOM x S
PROP x S
1
24
19
24
19
456
.01
.36
.06
.34
.06
.06
.04
5.80
.89
6.28
1.11
.001
.001
SIM x DOM x PROP
SIM x DOM x S
SIM x PROP x S
DOM x PROP x S
24
19
456
456
.32
.05
.06
.05
5.20
.75
.001
SIM x DOM x PROP x S 456
1999
.06
These F-ratios are based on quasi-F computations (Myers, 1972).
74.
Appendix E
Analysis of Variance of Reaction Time Data for Experiment 1
lax w c ui v ai -Ldllwc at MS F P
SIMILARITY (fixed)
DOMINANCE (fixed)
PROPOSITION (random)
SUBJECTS (random)
i
i
24
19
21,316,789
4,835,763
703,671
4,970,224
20.21*
4.70*
3.19
22.52
.001
.05
.001
.001
SIM x DOM
SIM x PROP
SIM x S
DOM x PROP
DOM x S
PROP x S
24
19
24
19
456
873,212
418,679
784,681
244,179
220,735
t \)£
3,68
1.77
3.30
I.03
.001
.05
.001
SIM x DOM x PROP
SIM x DOM x S
SIM x PROP x S
DOM x PROP x S
24
19
456
456
773,917
156,969
237,047
237,668
2.56
.52
.001
SIM x DOM x PROP x S 285**
1828
301,839
These F-ratios are based on quasi-F computations (Myers, 1972).
**The degrees of freedom were calculated as 4^6 minus the number
of errors (replaced reaction times), 171
•
75
Appendix F
Critical Stimuli for Experiment 2i
First Definition of Counterexample Frequency
Subject,
High Dominance
Furniture
Colors
Gems
Subject,
Low Dominance
Predicate,
High Typicality
Divans
Rockers
Maroon
Navy
Topaz
Opals
Parents
Files
Chisels
Berries
Nectarines
Wolves
Panthers
Vans
Pistols
Daggers
Denim
Flannel
Duplexes
Cabins
Softball
Cedars
Homicides
Rye
Ladles
Tongs
Larks
Doves
Nursing
Banking
Nickel
Suits
Slacks
Concert
Locusts
Bills
Coins
Bugles
Cellos
Charcoal
Potatoes
Cobalt
Marbles
Rattles
Flounders
Haddock
Yachts
Clippers
Predicate,
Low Typicality
Stereos
Mirrors
Indigo
Beige
Onyx
Jade
Grandsons
Pencils
Rulers
Prunes
Pumpkins
Giraffes
Camels
Sleds
Rope
Poisons
Burlap
Mohair
Tepees
Igloos
Fencing
Palms
Speeding
Brandy
Ovens
Sponges
Penguins
Chickens
Plumbing
Farming
Mercury
Scarves
Gloves
Dixieland
Worms
Bonds
Lira
Bells
Harps
Uranium
Lettuce
Acids
Bicycles
Bikes
Shrimp
Lobsters
Canoes
Barges
Relatives
Tools
Fruits
Animals
Vehicles
Weapons
Cloth
Dwellings
Sports
Trees
Crimes
Alcohol
Utensils
Birds
Professions
Metals
Clothing
Music
Insects
Money
Instruments
Fuels
Vegetables
Elements
Toys
Fish
Ships
Appendix G
Summary of Stimulus Characteristics for Experiment 2t
First Definition of Counterexample Pfreouency
Dominance
High Low
High 36 47 41
Low 41 43 42
38 ^5
Mean Battig-Montague (1969) values for
the predicate nouns in Experiment 2.
Dominance
High Low
Typicality High l^L^
Low 4.14 4.46 4.30
3.03 3.13
Mean ratings of the typicality of the
predicate instances with respect to the
category nouns with which they are paired.
*
Dominance
High Low
Typicality High l6 '* 21 '° l8 ' 6
Low 7.7 11.9 9.8
11.9 16.5
Mean frequency of English language usage
(Kucera and Francis, 1967) of the predicate
nouns in Experiment 2.
Dominance
High Low
Word Frequency 73.6 76.0
Definition 1,
Counterexample Frequency 413.6 318.1
Definition 2,
Counterexample Frequency 7.1 6.3
Summary of the characteristics of the
subject (category) nouns used in
Experiment 2.
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Appendix H
Critical Stimuli for Experiment 2i
Second De fi nition of Counterexample Frequency*
Category Number of Instances* Category Number of Instanc
Colors 11 Utensils 6
Relatives 11 Tools 6
Clothing 11 Fuels 6
Fruits 10 Insects 6
Instruments 1C Money 6
Vegetables 9 Trees 1 6
Animals 8 Gems 5
Furniture 8 Music 5
Alcohol 8 Dwellings k
Birds 8 Crimes
Vehicles 8 Ships
Fish 8 Weapons 3
Metals 7 Professions 3
7 Elements 3
Sports 7 Toys 3
According to the second definition of counterexample frequency,
categories (propositions) are partitioned on the basis of the
number of instances produced by fifty percent or more of the
subjects in the Battig and Montague (1969) category norms.
Since the instances paired with the categories remain the same
as for the first definition of counterexample frequency, they
are not repealed here.
Appendix I
Summary of Stimulus Characteristics for Experiment 2t
Second Definition of Counterexample Frequency
Dominance
Hisch Low
High 42 41 41
Low 44 41 42
43 41
Mean Battig-Montague (1969) values for
the predicate nouns in Experiment 2.
Dominance
High Low
Typicality High i^LJN^ 1.8?
Low 4.05 4.57 4.31
2.9^ 3.24
Mean ratings of the typicality of the
predicate instances with respect to the
category nouns with which they are paired.
Dominance
High Low
Typicality HiSh 22.1 18.6
Low 7.3 13.0 10.1
11.1 17.5
Mean frequency of English language usage
(Kucera and Francis, I96?) 0I> "the
predicate nouns in Experiment 2.
Dominance
_Hi£h Low
Word Frequency 66.3 83.8
Definition 1,
Counterexample Frequency 379.9 351.8
Definition 2,
Counterexample Frequency 8.7 *.7
Summary of the characteristics of the
subject (category) nouns used in
Experiment 2.
Appendix J
Summary of Results for Filler Items in ^PH.pnt
Reaction Time Number of Errors
1516 milliseconds 190 (l6.1%)
Summary of results for true propositions
in Experiment 2.
Appendix K
Analysis of Variance of Error Data for Experiment 2:
Definition 1 of Counterexample Frequency
Source of Variance df MS F
Counterexample Fre
quency (fixed)
Typicality (fixed)
items/FT (random)
Subjects (random)
FT
FS
TS
FTS
SI/FT
1 .06002 1.92*
1
. 14335 5.74*
.05
92 .03086 1.46
.05
20 .04926 2.33 .01
1 .00050 .02*
20 .02148 1.02
20
.01523 .72
20 .01820 .86
1840 .02113
2015
These F-ratios are based on quasi-F computations (Myers, 1972
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Appendix L
Analysis of Variance of Reaction Time Data for Experiment 2 s
Definition 1 of Counterexample Frequency
Source of Variance df MS F r
Counterexample Frequency
(fixed)
1 412,143 1.46*
Typicality (fixed)
Items/FT (random)
Subjects (random)
1
92
20
1,336,065
337,525
7,141,155
3-77*
1.96
41.51
.07
.001
.001
FT
FS
TS
1
20
20
270,286
115,909
188,776
.71*
.67
1.10
FTS 20 217,499 1.26
SI/FT 1795'** 172,025
1970
*These F-ratios are based on quasi-F computations (Myers, 1972),
*The degrees of freedom were calculated as 1840 minus the
number of errors (replaced RTs), ^5-
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Appendix M
Analysis of Variance of Error Rata for Experiment 2«
Definition 2 of Counterexample Frequency
Source of Variance
Counterexample Frequency (fixed)
Typicality (fixed)
Items/FT (random)
Subjects (random)
FT
FS
TS
FTS
SI/FT
df MS F P
1 .11161 3.46*
.07
1 .14335 5.88* .05
92 .03027 1.43 .05
20 .04926 2.33 .01
1 .00446 .16*
20 .0230? 1.09
20 .01523 .72
20 .01801
.85
1840 .02111
2015
These F-ratios are based on quasi-F computations (Myers, 1972).
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Appendix N
Analysis of Variance of Reaction Time Data for Experiment 2:
Definition 2 of Counterexample Frequency
Source of Variance
Counterexample Frequency (fixed)
Typicality (fixed)
Items/FT (random)
Subjects (random)
FT
FS
TS
FTS
SI/FT
ux MS F P
1 1,769,205 3.85* .08
1 1,365,417 4.01* .06
92 327,640 1.93 .005
20 7,109,367 41.88 .001
1 15,038 .04*
20 301,937 1.78 .05
20 182,240 1.07
20 213,965 1.26
1795** 169,772
1970
These F-ratios are based on quasi-F computations (Myers, 1972)
**The degrees of freedom were calculated as 1840 minus the
number of errors (replaced RTs), 45.
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